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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
DOUGLAS MCKAY, JR.*
I. ACTIONS & PROCEEDINGS
Several acts passed by the General Assembly and some de-
cisions of our Supreme Court are reviewed below in the dis-
cussion of this subtopic. It has proved impractical, in some
instances, for me to cover in detail some of the statutes which
are cited below. However, I have attempted in all instances
to note what the statute covers, in order that the practitioner,
having a question affected by a statute, may be advised of its
adoption.
A. Eminent Domain by Municipalities
A 1953 Act sets out in detail the procedure for condemna-
tion, valuation and appeal and reads:
Whenever any municipal corporation in this State de-
sires to become the owner of any real estate or to acquire
any easement or right of way through, over or across
such real estate for any corporate or public purpose for
which a municipality may now condemn real estate or
an interest therein .... 1
B. Suits Against Highway Department for Defects in High-
ways, etc.
Two acts were passed at the 1953 session relating to suits
for injuries resulting from defects in state highways. One
2
amends the existing code section to increase to $8,000 the
amount which can be recovered against the Highway Depart-
ment for injury or death resulting from defects in the high-
ways, etc. It is applicable only in causes of action accruing
after its approval. The other act 3 was passed for the pur-
pose of clarifying an existing code section so as to provide
that certain code sections4 relating to suits against the High-
*Member of firm of McKay and McKay, Columbia, S. C.
1. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 225, p. 272.
2. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 53, p. 53.
3. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 287, p. 362.
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 33-229 through 33-233.
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way Department for injuries, "shall not apply to injuries on
roads under construction when the Department is protected
by an indemnity bond."
C. Suit to Recover Taxes Paid Under Protest
A 1954 Act" applicable where the "state or county charges
or levies any tax whatsoever against any person," allows
payment of a disputed tax under protest, and the bringing of
suit within 30 days in the Common Pleas Court for the re-
covery of the tax. It also sets out procedure, party to be sued,
venue, and so forth.
D. Proceedings for Support of Dependents
A 1954 Act repealing the existing "Uniform Support of
Dependents Act,"' 7 is designed "to improve and extend by re-
ciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support and
to make uniform the law with respect thereto." This act is
quite detailed and provides procedures for the enforcement of
support decrees, apprehension of absconding and defaulting
parents and spouses, etc.
E. Declaratory Judgments
A section8 of the Declaratory Judgments Act provides:
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be
made parties who have or claim any interest which would
be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of parties who had or claim any inter-
est which would be affected by the declaration, and no dec-
laration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties
to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the
validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the munici-
pality shall be made a party and shall be entitled to be
heard. If the statute, ordinance, or franchise is alleged to
be unconstitutional the attorney general shall also be
served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be en-
titled to be heard. (Emphasis added.)
In Lee v. Clark9 an elector and taxpayer residing in the
affected school district sought a declaratory judgment holding
5. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 673, p. 1720.
6. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 548, p. 1421.
7. CODE OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 20-311 through 20-336,
repealed.
8. CODE OF LAWS oF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-2008.
9. 224 S.C. 138, 77 S.E. 2d 485 (1953).
ol. 7
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unconstitutional an act for the elections of school trustees,
which gave a preference to women candidates. The case in-
volved several questions under the above code section.
(1) Constitutionality of an Act: It was held that the con-
stitutionality of an act may be challenged under the Declara-
tory Judgment statute.
(2) Parties: A private citizen may seek a declaratory judg-
ment on the constitutionality of an act. He must show that he
has a substantial interest in the subject matter, and will be
directly affected by the enforcement of the challenged act.
As an elector and taxpayer, plaintiff had an interest in the
enforcement of the act which he alleged invaded his political
rights. The Court held that: "An individual whose civil or
political rights are directly affected by a statute may have
the necessary interest to challenge the validity of the statute
by a declaratory judgment proceeding."
(3) Procedure: Where the constitutionality of a statute is
challenged under the declaratory judgment act, the attorney
general must be served with copy of the pleadings, and is en-
titled to be heard. Another code section 0 authorizing the at-
torney general in the name of the State, or, on leave granted
by a Circuit Judge, any private party, to bring action against
any person who unlawfully holds or usurps public office, etc.,
was held inapplicable here. Therefore, it was not essential
that plaintiff obtain leave of court in order to bring the
action, or that action be brought by the attorney general.
(4) Burden of Proof in declaratory judgment proceedings:
Martin v. Cantrell" was a proceeding under the declaratory
judgment act to have a restriction on realty invalidated. On
the question of burden of proof, the Court held:
Plaintiff seeks affirmative relief under the declaratory
judgment act and of course the burden of proof rests
upon her in this action, as well as in other actions, to
prove the material allegations of her complaint by the
greater weight or preponderance of the testimony. Our
attention has not been called to any authority where the
burden of proof in an action under the declaratory judg-
ment act rests any less heavily upon the shoulders of the
plaintiff than in the ordinary civil action. (Emphasis
added.)
10. CODE OF LAWS OF SoUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-2256.
11. 81 S.E. 2d 37 (S.C. 1954).
1954]
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F. Controversies Involving State Boards, Commissions, etc.
A 1954 Act 12 provides:
The Circuit Courts of this State are hereby vested with
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions, actions
and controversies, other than those involving rates of pub-
lic service companies for which specific procedures for
review are provided in Title 58, Code of Laws 1952, af-
fecting Boards, Commissions and Agencies of the State
of South Carolina, and officials of the State of South
Carolina in their official capacities, in the circuit where
such question, action or controversy arises. (Emphasis
added.)
G. Proceedings for Contempt
In Fagan v. Timmons' 3 appellant was ruled in contempt
by the lower court for failing to comply with an order direct-
ing her to surrender certain records to a receiver. The Su-
preme Court held that it would not "disturb the findings of
the trial court where such matters are within its jurisdiction,"
absent abuse of discretion. On the question of the lower court's
power to rule in contempt it said:
... Such power should be used sparingly and with cau-
tion having at all times regard for one's constitutional
rights; it should be exercised only when necessary to pre-
vent actual or direct obstruction or interference with the
administration of justice. Within these limitations, how-
ever, the matter of determining and dealing with con-
tempts is within the court's sound discretion, subject to
the absolute provisions of the law, and its determination
is final unless there is a plain abuse of discretion.
H. Discovery
1. Inspection of Documents: The code section allowing in-
spection of books, papers and documents in the possession of a
party 4 provides:
The Court before which a civil action is pending or a
judge or justice thereof, may -in his discretion and upon
due notice, order either party to give to the other, within
12. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 624, p. 1541.
13. 224 S.C. 286, 78 S.E. 2d 628 (1953).
14. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-502.
[Vol. 7
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a specified time, an inspection and copy or permission to
take a copy of any books, papers and documents in his
possession or under his control containing evidence relat-
ing to the merits of the action or the defense therein. If
compliance with the order be refused, the Court, on mo-
tion, may exclude the paper from being in evidence, or
punish the party refusing or both.
In Bradley v. Southern Weaving Co.,15 plaintiff sued for
unpaid compensation based in part upon sales commissions.
Plaintiff moved the lower court for an order requiring defend-
ant to allow plaintiff to inspect certain records, which the
court granted. Defendant, on appeal, argued that plaintiff
was a competitor of defendant and might use the information
to gain a competitive advantage. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the discovery and remanded the case to the lower court
with directions to issue such orders as were necessary to pro-
duce the documents for plaintiff's inspection, ". . . But at the
same time to provide reasonable and appropriate protection to
the defendant against compulsory disclosure of confidential
information which is wholly irrelevant to the issues in this
case."
In another case, Williams v. Southern Life Ins. Co.16 (con-
sidered more fully in the next section relating to examination
of parties), the Supreme Court held that the code section per-
mitting inspection of documents could not be invoked by de-
fendant to require plaintiff to produce an insurance policy
which she alleged in her complaint has been surrendered to the
defendant.
2. Examination of Adverse Party: Two code sections apply
to this point. The first provides: "A party to an action may be
examined as a witness at the instance of the adverse party
and for that purpose may be completed, in the same manner
and subject to the same rules of examination as any other
witness, to testify either at the trial, or conditionally, or upon
commission."l 7 The other section permits examination of an
adverse party, "at any time before the trial," and provides the
procedure to be followed.1
8
In Williams v. Southern Life Ins. Co., supra, the plaintiff
sued two insurance companies, which allegedly induced her
15. 224 S.C. 201, 78 S.E. 2d 237 (1953).
16. 224 S.C. 415, 79 S.E. 2d 365 (1953).
17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-510.
18. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTn CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-503.
1954]
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to surrender a policy naming her as beneficiary in exchange
for a refund of premiums. The defendants moved for an order
permitting them to examine the plaintiff before trial with
reference to the policy referred to in the complaint. The Su-
preme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his dis-
cretion in denying the motion. "Apparently the defendants
seek to discover the evidence on which the plaintiff bases her
cause of action. It is improper to grant an examination for
this purpose. . . . It was held ... that an examination of a
party is not allowed to prove, 'whether or not' facts are as al-
leged." (Emphasis added, citations omitted.)
The above case is just in result, but in the writer's opin-
ion our Court should relax the long established concept that
discovery cannot be used by a party to discover the evidence
of his adversary. The statute itself contains no such limita-
tions, and the Court by modifying this concept would create
a valuable -instrument for the furtherance of justice and
equity.
II. PROCESS & SERVICE
A. Service Essential to Jurisdiction of Defendant
In King v. Moore19 the Court, in quashing a purported serv-
ice of process on one defendant, said:
In the absence of voluntary submission- to the juris-
diction of the Court, one named in the summons and com-
plaint as a defendant becomes a party only after lawful
service of the summons upon him.... The defendant is
subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts by some form
of service of process. At common law the form of service
of process necessary to give the court jurisdiction over
an individual defendant is personal service upon him
within the State. In the absence of a statute, service other
than personal service within the State is insufficient to
give the court jurisdiction over the defendant, even
though he is domiciled in the State or otherwise subject
to the jurisdiction of the State. (Emphasis and omis-
sions mine.)
B. Service by Publication on Resident Who Has Left the
State
19. 224 S.C. 400, 79 S.E. 2d 460 (1954), discussed also herein under
"Change of Venue." See also Camp v. Petroleum Carrier Corp., 204
S.C. 133, 28 S.E. 2d 683 (1944).
[Vol. 7
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In King v. Moore, supra, there was an attempt to serve
by publication the defendant Snipes, a resident of Berkeley
County, who, at the time of service was in Maryland. Service
was made under the code section20 permitting service by pub-
lication, which reads: "When the defendant, being a resident
of this State, has departed therefrom with intent to defraud
his creditors, or to avoid service of a summons, or keeps him-
self concealed therein with like intent." The court held that
the above section provided a means of service only on defend-
ants who were domiciled in South Carolina, although absent
therefrom, since a South Carolina statute providing for service
in Maryland on a resident of that state would be invalid. The
Court then held that the burden was on plaintiffs to show
that Snipes had left the state to avoid service of process,
which plaintiffs had failed to prove.
C. Amendment of Defective Proof of Service
The code provides, 21 "At any time in its discretion and upon
such terms as it deems just the court may allow any process
or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly
appears that material prejudice would result to the substan-
tial rights of the party against whom the process is issued."
In Corley v. Wells,2 2 defendant moved to set aside a judg-
ment against him on grounds that the summons was not prop-
erly served on him, and the proof of service failed to show
service properly made. The lower court granted the motions
and held that the affidavit of service could not be supplement-
ed to cure defects. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court under the above statute. The case was remanded
with direction that findings be made whether process was
properly served, and whether amendment of proof of service
thereof, "would result in substantial prejudice to right of the
defendants."
III. CHANGE OF VENUE
Several cases were decided on Change of Venue, but they
do not present any unusual problems. They fall into two cate-
gories, the first on "convenience of witnesses and promotion
of the ends of justice," the second on "residence of defend-
ants."
20. CODE or LAws or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-451 (2).
21. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-409.
22. 224 S.C. 198, 78 S.E. 2d 186 (1954).
1954]
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A. Promotion of Convenience of Witnesses and Ends of Jus-
tice
1. General Considerations. The code provides :23 "The Court
may change the place of trial in the following cases: ... (3)
when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted by the change." (Omissions mine.)
In Haigler v. Westbury24 an order granting defendant's
motion for a change of venue from Dorchester County where
he resided and suit was brought to Orangeburg County where
the accident occurred and plaintiffs and most witnesses re-
sided was affirmed by the Supreme Court on grounds that it
promoted the convenience of witnesses and the ends of jus-
tice.
In Hayes v. Clarkson25 the Supreme Court held that the
lower court did not abuse its discretion in transferring a case
on plaintiff's motion from Chesterfield County where defend-
ant resided to Marion County where the accident occurred,
and most witnesses but neither party resided. "The very ob-
ject of our jury system in requiring jurors from the vicinage
to pass upon the credibility of witnesses is the promotion of
the ends of justice."
Wallace v. Dickerson Construction C0.21 was brought orig-
inally in Darlington County against two defendants. It was
first removed to the Federal Court by defendant Dickerson,
then remanded to the State Court whereupon defendant
Brewer moved for and was granted an order changing the
place of trial to Lancaster County where he resided. Plain-
tiff then moved to change the place of trial back to Darling-
ton County where the accident occurred and many witnesses
resided. The lower court, affirmed by the Supreme Court,
moved the case back to Darlington on the grounds that the
movant had established that the convenience of witnesses
would be better served by trial in that county.
This case illustrates the point that the "convenience of wit-
nesses, etc." ground may outweigh the "residence of defend-
ant" ground. In this connection see also the earlier case of
Roof v. Tiller, 2 7 and contrast the result with the case of King
23. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-310.
24. 223 S.C. 517,77 S.E. 2d 207 (1954).
25. 224 S.C. 274, 78 S.E. 2d 454 (1954).
26. 224 S.C. 396, 79 S.E. 2d 371 (1954).
27. 195 S.C. 132, 10 S.E. 2d 333, 132 A.L.R. 500 (1940).
[Vol. 7
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v. Moore28 discussed below under the "residence" ground.
This construction is implied by the last sentence of the "resi-
dence" statute, infra.
2. Burden of Proof and Showing to be Made. "To authorize
a change of venue under the Code section upon which defend-
ant relies, the burden is upon him to show that both the con-
venience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted
by the change. If he has made a prima facie showing as to
both requirements, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to overcome
the showing mode as to the least one of them. ' 2 9 (Emphasis
added.)
3. Review of Orders Granting or Denying Change. Appeals
from orders granting or denying change of venue on grounds
of convenience of witnesses and promotion of justice have met
with no success in the cases reviewed by the writer. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held: "Such a motion is addressed
to the judicial discretion of the lower court and will be re-
versed only in case of manifest legal error."80  (Emphasis
added.)
In Wilson v. Southern Furn. Co.31 the Court held that dispo-
sition of the motion for change of venue "... is within the dis-
cretion of the hearing court and the exercise of it will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion
or unless it is... so opposed to a sound discretion as to amount
to a deprivation of the legal rights of the complaining party."
(Emphasis and omissions of citations mine.)
B. Residence of Defendant
1. General Considerations. The code provides :32
In all other cases the action shall be tried in the county
in which the defendant resides at the time of the com-
mencement of the action. If there be more than one de-
fendant, then the action may be fried in any county in
which one or more of the defendants to such action re-
sides at the time of the commencement of the action.
If none of the parties shall reside in the State the action
shall be tried in any county which the plaintiff shall des-
ignate in his complaint. This section is subject, however,
28. 224 S.C. 400, 79 S.E. 2d 460 (1954).
29. See note 24 supra. Also see Wilson v. Southern Furniture Co.,
224 S.C. 281, 78 S.E. 2d 890 (1953).
30. See note 24 supra.
31. 224 S.C. 281, 78 S.E. 2d 890 (1954).
32. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-302.
1954]
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to the power of the court to change the place of trial in
certain cases as provided by law. (Emphasis added.)
In one case arising under this statute, King v. Moore,3 3 ac-
tion was brought in Berkeley County, where the accident oc-
curred, naming as defendants one Snipes, a resident of that
county, and Moore and Calcutt, who were residents of Florence
County. The Florence residents were served first and had
filed and argued motions for changeof venue to their home
county before service by publication was attempted on Snipes,
who had left the State. Snipes appeared specially and moved
to quash service upon him. The trial judge denied both mo-
tions, but was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held the
purported service upon Snipes was invalid and therefore did
not bring him into the case as a party s 4 With Snipes elimi-
nated, only the two Florence County residents were left and
the Supreme Court held that they were entitled to trial in
their home county, under the above statute.
In Peters v. Double Cola Bottling Co.,3 5 suit was brought
by plaintiff in Dorchester County against one Kizer, a retailer
residing in that county, and a bottling corporation whose head-
quarters was Columbia. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that she
became ill from a soft drink made by the defendant bottler
which she purchased in Kizer's store. The bottling company
moved for a change of venue to Richland County, on ground
that the joinder of Kizer was not bona fide, being solely for
the purpose of maintaining venue in Dorchester County. The
lower court denied the motion and was sustained by the Su-
preme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the facts alleged in the com-
plaint set out a cause of action under the Pure Food and Drug
Act as well as at common law. Since the Act makes it un-
lawful to sell or manufacture deleterious food, a cause of ac-
tion was alleged against both defendants, and the joinder was
not mala fide. "Where two defendants who reside in different
counties are sued jointly, the statute provides that the case
may be tried in either of the two counties."
Certain earlier decisions on mala fide joinder are cited in
33. See note 28 supra.
34. This feature of the case is discussed herein under "Process & Serv-
ice."
35. 224 S.C. 437, 79 S.E. 2d 710 (1954).
[Vol. 7
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the footnote.3 6 They may be of some aid to attorneys moving
for change of venue under the "residence of defendant" stat-
ute.
2. Matters to be considered by lower court in ruling on mo-
tion. " . . . The court is mindful that the lower court sits as
judge and jury and in ruling upon the issue, may go beyond
the pleadings to determine whether or not the defendant is ma'-
terial and bona fide. A defendant may be mala fide, so as to
require the granting of a motion to change venue even though
the allegations (and proof apparently available) may be suffi-
cient to submit the case to the jury .... And so, whether or
not a cause of action is stated in the complaint is not always
controlling. '3 7 (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
IV. TRIALS & JUDGMENTS
A. Juror-Disqualification for Relationship to Party
The Code provides in part:38 "The Court shall, on motion
of either party to the suit, examine on oath any person who
is called as a juror therein to know whether he is related to
either party. If it appears to the Court that the juror is not
indifferent to the cause, he shall be placed aside." (Omis-
sions and emphasis mine.)
In Smith v. Quattlebaum9 the losing party, after the trial,
learned that one of the jurors was related to the prevailing
party within the sixth degree and moved for a new trial on
this ground. The motion was denied on the finding that the
verdict rendered was sustained by the evidence and the juror
did not know of any kinship with the plaintiff until after the
trial was in progress.
In construing the above code section the Supreme Court held
that there is no statute fixing the degree of affinity or consan-
guinity which will disqualify a juror as a matter of law, and
that the matter of disqualification on this ground was within
the sound discretion of the trial judge. It said: "It is not by
reason of consanguinity or affinity that a juror becomes dis-
qualified, but in the exercise of the discretion of the trial
36. Rosamond v. Lucas Kidd Motor Co., 183 S.C. 544, 191 S.E. 516
(1937); White v. Nichols, 190 S.C. 45, 1 S.E. 2d 916 (1939); Dunbar v.
Evins, 198 S.C. 146, 17 S.E. 2d 137 (1941); Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 217 S.C. 16, 59 S.E. 2d 344 (1950).
37. See note 35 supra. Also see cases cited in note 14 supra.
38. CoDu OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 38-202.
39. 223 S.C. 384, 76 S.E. 2d 154 (1953).
1954]
11
McKay: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTI[LY
judge, he is subject to disqualification because of possible in-
terest in the case." (Emphasis added.)
B. Instruction to Jury and Objections Thereto
1. Statute-objections and requests to charge out of pres-
ence of jury. The following act, passed in 1953,40 is of impor-
tance to trial lawyers. It provides:
In all cases tried before a jury, other than cases in a
magistrate's or municipal court, after the court has de-
livered to the jury a charge on the law in the case, the
court shall temporarily excuse the jury from the presence
of counsel and litigants in order to give counsel and liti-
gants an opportunity to express objections to the charge
or request the charge of additional propositions made
necessary by the charge, out of the presence of the jury.
No cases construing the above act have come to the writer's
attention. In those cases below which might have been affect-
ed by it, it was not before the Court.
In Reese v. National Surety Corp.,41 it was held that the
trial judge did not commit error in refusing a special request
to charge submitted by a party, where he had already covered
the requested matter in his general charge.
2. Counsels' duty to advise trial judge of error in rulings
or instructions. The appellant charged that the trial judge
had instructed the jury on certain elements of damages on
which there was no evidence. The Supreme Court held:
.. .we think the deficiency in the testimony in these
particulars should have been called to the Court's atten-
tion. The rule is well established in this state that an in-
struction upon an issue as to which there is no evidence
is not reversible error unless the attention of the Court
is called to that fact.42 (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
Myers v. Evans43 applies a different rule. In that case
plaintiff sued for injuries received when she was struck by
a truck while crossing the highway. On appeal, plaintiff ex-
cepted to an instruction of the trial judge based on a code sec-
tion44 which was inapplicable under the evidence.
40. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 28, p. 28.
41. 224 S.C. 489, 80 S.E. 2d 47 (1954).
42. See note 41 supra.
43. 81 S.E. 2d 32 (S.C. 1954).
44. CODE OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 46-435.
[Vol. 7
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On the matter of counsels' failure to call the erroneous rul-
ing to the trial judge's attention the Supreme Court held that:
The question of the applicability of the statute did not
arise for the first time during the charge. It was neces-
sarily discussed on respondents motion for nonsuit, one
ground of which was that appellant was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law.... In overruling
this motion the trial judge did not eliminate this statute
but ruled that it was 'a matter for the jury'. It is obvious
that throughout the trial the Court deemed this statute
relevant.... Appellant's counsel certainly had no right
to assume that the charging of the statute was mere in-
advertence on the part of the trial judge. It is not a
case of misstatement of issues but an erroneous construc-
tion .... 45 (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
C. Default Judgment-Unliquidated Claims
A 1953 Act46 authorizes the Court of Common Pleas on
motion of plaintiff to refer any issues in any default case
whether the cause of action, "be in contract or tort," and
whether the claim be "liquidated or unliquidated" and to hear
the allegations of the plaintiff "in term time or at chambers"
and to "render judgment for the plaintiff for such relief as
his allegations and proof may warrant."
In Patrick v. Wolowek4 7 the Supreme Court held this act
had no retroactive effect and could not validate a default judg-
ment rendered before its passage by a judge without a jury
in a tort case for unliquidated damages. Accordingly, it set
aside the judgment which had been rendered by the Circuit
Judge without a jury.
D. Nonsuit and Direction of Verdict
1. Grounds. In Simmons v. Service Life & Health Ins. Co.
48
the Supreme Court overruled an order of the lower court
granting a nonsuit and held: "Involuntary nonsuit on the
merits is proper only when the evidence of the plaintiff af-
firmatively shows as a "matter of law that he is not entitled
to the relief sought in the complaint." (Emphasis added.)
45. See Steinberg v. S. C. Power Co., 165 S.C. 367, 163 S.E. 881 (1932).
Also, on "inadvertence" of trial judge in using the word "defendant"
instead of "plaintiff" in his charge, see Smalls v. LaRoache, 93 S.C.
45, 75 S.E. 1016 (1912).
46. S. C. AcTs AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 114, p. 137.
47. 81 S.E. 2d 717 (S.C. 1954).
48. 223 S.C. 407, 76 S.E. 2d 288 (1954).
1954]
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In an appeal from refusal of the lower court to direct a
verdict, the Court in Davenport v. Woodside Cotton Mills Co.""
held:
. . . The well established rule in this state is that if
there is any testimony whatever to go to the jury on an
issue involved in a cause, or even if more than one infer-
ence can be drawn from the testimony, then it is the duty
of the judge to submit the cause of action to the jury.
This is true, even if witnesses for the plaintiff contradict
each other, or if a witness himself makes a conflicting
statement. The credibility of witnesses is entirely for the
jury.... (Emphasis added.)
In Cannon v. Motors Insurance Corp.,50 involving the ques-
tion of ownership of an automobile, the Supreme Court re-
versed the direction of verdict below on the ground that there
was evidence to go to the jury on the issue of title, saying,
"... If the evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable in-
ference, the question is no longer a question for the jury but
one of law for the Court, otherwise, the issue or issues become
a question of fact for the consideration of the jury ... ." (Em-
phasis and omissions mine.)
In Coffee v. Anderson Countys1 a suit for injuries received
from a highway defect, the Court held that verdict could not
be directed if, considering the evidence most strongly against
the moving party, there was a scintilla of evidence to carry the
case to the jury.
In Barnwell v. Elliott 2 a suit by an employee injured by
falling lumber, the Court held: ". . . even though a non-suit
should have been granted at conclusion of plaintiff's testi-
mony, yet, if the deficiency was supplied either on direct or
cross examination of defendants' witnesses, neither a nonsuit
nor a directed verdict could be granted at the conclusion of all
the testimony." (Emphasis mine.)
2. Prior Adjudication of Negligence of Person not Party. In
Gillespie v. Ford,3 plaintiff sued defendants for property dam-
age and loss of consortium of his wife arising out of an inter-
section collision between plaintiff's automobile, driven by his
wife, and an automobile operated by defendant. In a com-
49. 225 S.C. 52, 79 S.E. 2d 369 (1954).
50. 224 S.C. 368, 79 S.E. 2d 371 (1954).
51. 224 S.C. 477, 80 S.E. 2d 51 (1954).
52. 80 S.E. 2d 748 (S.C. 1954).
53. 81 S.E. 2d 44 (S.C. 1954).
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panion case by the wife,5 4 she was, on appeal, found guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and for this reason,
the trial judge in the present case granted a nonsuit in the
husband's action. The Supreme Court reversed the order of
nonsuit, on the grounds that, "The causes of action in the two
cases are entirely different and distinct, and the judgment
in favor of the defendants in an action on one is not a bar
to an action on the other. On this point the authorities are
practically unanimous." 55
3. Order Directing Verdict and Granting Nonsuit. In Sim-
mons v. Service Life & Health Ins. Co.,'6 plaintiff sued defend-
ant for fraudulent breach of contract, seeking actual and puni-
tive damages for alleged wrongful lapse of an insurance policy.
At trial, defendant put up no testimony, and moved for a non-
suit on the issue of punitive damages at the close of plaintiff's
case. The trial judge on his own motion directed a verdict for
plaintiff on the issue of actual damages, and ordered a non-
suit on punitive damages. The plaintiff appealed for a new
trial on grounds that there was evidence justifying submis-
sion of the case to the jury on the issue of punitive damages,
but asked in his brief that the judgment for actual damages
be affirmed. Defendant did not appeal. The Supreme Court
granted a new trial on both actual and punitive damages, de-
clining to sustain plaintiff's request for affirmance of the
judgment of actual damages, "in the first place because no
suck proposition is presented by his exceptions, and secondly
because only his evidence was heard in the trial under re-
view."
It is difficult to understand why the Supreme Court set
aside the lower court's direction of verdict for actual dam-
ages, when neither party appealed from this ruling. The rea-
sons given by the Court, quoted above, invite further ques-
tions. For this reason the writer has noted hereinafter a few
propositions of law, which indicate either that the relief
granted is out of line with precedent, or else, that it overrules
such precedent.
First: A trial judge can order a nonsuit or direct a verdict
either on his own motion or on motion of counsel in the case,
as was held in Gobbel v. Columbia Rwy. Gas & Elec. Co.5
54. See Gillespie v. Ford, 222 S.C. 46, 71 S.E. 2d 596 (1952).
55. See Priester v. Sou. Ry. Co., 151 S.C. 433, 149 S.E. 226 (1929).
56. 223 S.C. 407, 76 S.E. 2d 288 (1953).
57. 107 S.C. 367, 93 S.E. 137 (1917).
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Second: "No exception was taken to the ruling and, right or
wrong, it is the law of the case."108 Various examples of appli-
cation of law of the case doctrine to rulings of the trial judge
not objected to nor appealed from, include: Instructions to the
jury'; order overruling demurrer 0 ; or confirming sale by
receiver"1 ; or refusing leave to bring in a party.
6 2
Third: "'Although there are exceptional cases, the general
rule is that a plaintiff or defendant cannot appeal or prosecute
a writ of error from or to a judgment, order, or decree in his
own favor, since he is not aggrieved thereby'."'6
E. Exemption of Certain Insurance Proceeds From Process.
A 1953 Act 4 amending the code by adding a new section,
provides:
When the proceeds of a life insurance policy, becoming
a claim by death of the insured, are left with an insur-
ance company under a trust or other agreement, the bene-
fits accruing thereunder after the death of the insured
shall not be transferable, nor subject to computation or
incumbrance, nor to legal process except in an action to
recover for necessaries, if the parties to the trust or other
agreement so agree.
F. Jurisdiction of Judge After Sine Die Adjournment.
In Smith v. Quattlebaum5 defendant moved before the trial
judge after sine die adjournment of the court for a new trial
on evidence discovered after the trial that a juror was re-
lated to plaintiff. The trial judge denied the motion on grounds
discussed elsewhere herein, 0 and the Supreme Court affirmed
him, but held on the question of the judge's powers after court
adjournment:
Generally, when a trial judge adjourns his court sine
die, he loses jurisdiction of a case finally determined in
58. Wilson v. Dove, 118 S.C. 256, 110 S.E. 390 (1922).
59. Hinson v. Roof, 128 S.C. 470, 122 S.E. 488 (1924) ; Falls v. Caro-
lina Power & Light Co., 117 S.C. 327, 109 S.E. 93 (1921).
60. Prather v. Clover Spinning Mills, 215 S.C. 103, 54 S.E. 2d 529
(1949).
61. Utley v. S. W. Wilson & Sons, 205 S.C. 469, 32 S.E. 2d 654 (1944).
62. C. I. T. Corp. v. Corley, 196 S.C. 339, 13 S.E. 2d 440 (1941).
63. Wilson v. Southern Railway Co., 123 S.C. 399, 114 S.E. 764 (1923);
See also Towill v. Southern Railway Co., 131 S.C. 425, 127 S.E. 559
(1925).
64. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 367, § 3, p. 509.
65. 223 S.C. 384, 76 S.E. 2d 154 (1953).
66. See IV (A), this work, "Jurors, etc."
[Vol. 7
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1954], Art. 19
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss1/19
SURVI'Y OV SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
that term, except under special circumstances. An excep-
tion to this general rule is a motion for new trial on after
or newly discovered evidence. There is no sound reason
why a motion for new trial on after-discovered evidence
disqualification of a juror, alleged as such, should not be
within the same category as the motion referred to in the
preceding paragraph. (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
V. APPEAL & REVIEW
A. Grounds Not Raised Below.
In Industrial Equipment Co. v. Montague67 the Supreme
Court reiterated the rule that the appellate court will not con-
sider a point not raised or decided by the court below. How-
ever, in Town of Forest Acres v. Seigler68 the Court made an
exception to this rule. In that case, a contest of a municipal
annexation, the matter was heard by the lower court in 1952
before the 1952 Code had been ratified. The Supreme Court
held that it would consider the question of whether or not the
provisions of the 1952 Code relating to annexation of prop-
erty were retroactive, where the public interest required its
prompt determination, even though this ground was not and
could not have been presented to the court below when the case
was heard.
B. Exception Not Argued on Appeal.
In Reese v. National Surety Co.,69 the Supreme Court held
that an exception not argued on appeal is presumably aban-
doned.
C. Order Granting or Refusing a New Trial.
In Turner v. Carey70 on appeal from an order of the lower
court granting a new trial to plaintiff on grounds of inade-
quate damages, the Supreme Court held:
It is well settled in this state that an order granting
or refusing a new trial when based solely on an error of
law is subject to review by this court, but when the order
is based upon questions of fact or upon both. questions of
law and fact, it is not appealable.
... The well settled rule is that this court cannot re-
view an order granting or refusing a new trial except for
67. 224 S.C. 510, 80 S.E. 2d 114 (1954).
68. 224 S.C. 166, 77 S.E. 2d 900 (1953).
69. See note 41 supra.
70. 223 S.C. 477, 76 S.E. 2d 671 (1953).
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error of law, as the court is without jurisdiction to re-
view the judgment of the circuit court on questions of
fact.... (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
Thus, in Tedder v. Coca-Cola, Bottling Co. of Darlington,
7 1
the Supreme Court refused to set aside the trial judge's order
denying defendant a new trial on grounds of excessive ver-
dict. The trial judge held as a fact that he observed nothing
in the trial of the case indicating any passion, prejudice or
other improper considerations which influenced the jury. "It
must be remembered that findings of the trial judge in this
particular connection are entitled to great and almost con-
clusive weight and will not be disturbed ordinarily." (Em-
phasis mine.)
In Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. 72 the Supreme
Court refused to overrule the order of the trial judge denying
a new trial to defendant on grounds of excessive verdict, say-
ing: "Under our cases, the question of whether or not a ver-
dict is excessive is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge, subject, of course, to the limitation that this court
will intervene in the case of an abuse of discretion .... "
See also Nichols v. Craven73 where the Supreme Court dis-
missed appeal from order of the lower court granting a new
trial on grounds that the verdict was inadequate.
D. Findings of Fact of Master Concurred in by Circuit
Judge in Equity.
In Newton v. Batson74 the Court reaffirmed the oft-recited
principle that: "It is the settled law of this state that in an
equity case findings of fact by a master concurred in by a cir-
cuit judge will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown
that such findings are without any evidence to support them or
are against the clear preponderance of the evidence." (Em-
phasis added.)
In Ives v. Ires75 the Supreme Court applied the same rule
in an appeal from an order of the circuit judge affirming the
master, in a proceeding brought to reform the description of a
deed. The above rule has long been followed by our Court.
It appears unusual, however, when we consider the section
71. 224 S.C. 46, 77 S.E. 2d 293 (1953).
72. 81 S.E. 2d 335 (S.C. 1954).
73. 224 S.C. 244, 78 S.E. 2d 376 (1953).
74. 223 S.C. 545,77 S.E. 2d 212 (1954).
75. 223 S.C. 461, 76 S.E. 2d 471 (1953).
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of the State Constitution relating to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court 0 which provides, in part, that the Supreme
Court, " . . . shall have appellate jurisdiction only in cases
of Chancery, and in such appeals they shall review findings
of fact as well as law, except in Chancery cases where the
facts are settled by a jury and the verdict not set aside....
E. Finding by Trial Judge in Law Case.
Land v. Franklin Nat. Ins. Co.77 was an action on a ma-
rine policy covering a speed boat damaged by sinking when
hull planking opened from torque of heavy engine at full
throttle. The trial judge found that the boat was seaworthy
and held the insurance company liable. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court held:
More important than our view of the evidence on this
feature, and conclusive of the evidence is the consideration
that the trial court expressly found that the boat was sea-
worthy when insured and afterward, and supported by
evidence, the finding is conclusive upon appeal, in this, a
law case. (Emphasis added.)
Knight v. Hilton" involved a partition of realty and re-
spondent claimed title to one parcel by adverse possession.
The circuit judge reversed the master and found that plain-
tiff had title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court said:
The circuit judge held respondent had established title
by adverse possession. This being a legal issue, it must
be conceded that his conclusion is binding on this court
if there is any evidence reasonably tending to sustain it.
... However, the facts before us are undisputed and the
question is purely a legal one. (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court then held that there was not sufficient
evidence to sustain the circuit judge's finding and reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings below.
In Austin-Griffith, Inc. v. Goldberg,7 9 plaintiff builders
sought to foreclose mechanic's liens and defendant owners
pleaded certain offsets. By consent of the parties the matter
was referred to a referee, and the circuit judge affirmed the
76. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Art. 5, § 4;
CODE OF LAWS 0' SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, Vol. 7, p. 173.
77. 225 S.C. 33, 80 S.E. 2d 420 (1954).
78. 224 S.C. 452, 79 S.E. 2d 871 (1954).
79. 224 S.C. 372, 79 S.E. 2d 447 (1953).
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referee on some counts, and reversed him on others. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court held:
... It should be stated that on the disputed issues of
fact arising in this case, either party had the right to a
jury trial .... However, no such right was asserted and
by consent of the parties the case was referred as if it
were one in equity.... We have, therefore, determined the
facts in accordance with our view of the preponderance
of the evidence. (Emphasis mine, citations omitted.)
F. Power of Supreme Court to Reverse Nisi.
In Padgett v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,80 action was brought
under a $100 deductible automobile policy. The Supreme Court
ordered a new trial unless plaintiff remitted on the record
the $100 deduction, holding: "The Supreme Court may affirm
nisi where damages improperly allowed can be segregated."
VI. JURY SERVICE, COSTS AND TERMS OF
CIRCUIT COURTS
The following acts are merely noted as information without
discussion of their provisions.
A 1954 Act provides that in those counties where the Com-
mon Pleas Court is held during the same week as the General
Sessions Court, jurors called for General Sessions shall also
be used for Common Pleas.8
1
Two acts were adopted fixing the fees to be charged by
the Clerks of Court of Horry County8 2 and Jasper County 8
for the filing of pleadings, etc., in the Common Pleas Court.
Several acts were passed changing, extending or rearrang-
ing terms of Common Pleas or General Sessions Courts for
various counties or circuits. I have merely listed the counties
or circuits affected without further discussion of the changes
themselves.
The acts relate to terms of court in Beaufort County,8 4
Berkeley and Charleston Counties,85  Calhoun County,8 6
80. 223 S.C. 533, 77 S.E. 2d 219 (1954).
81. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 569, p. 1445.
82. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 68, p. 67.
83. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 6, p. 8.
84. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 333, p. 440.
85. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 65, p. 64.
86. S. 0. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 34, p. 34.
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Dillon County,8 7 Fairfield County and York County,88 Green-
wood and Laurens Counties,89 McCormick County,90 Sumter
County,91 and the Tenth Circuit.92
87. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 32, p. 32, and Na
25, p. 26.
88. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 206, p. 253.
89. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1953, No. 247, p. 311.
90. S. C. AcTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 545, p. 1418.
91. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 555, p. 1432.
92. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954, No. 689, p. 1749.
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